THE NECESSITY OF DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY
WHAT IS REAL MORALITY?
Before we get into the depth and grit of talking about
philosophical morality, it is useful to have a clear definition of what
morality is. It can be agreed that morality is the stuff that makes
people think they ought to do some things and not do some other things.
We have many assumptions of morality--; we feel that it is right to
provide for our family, for instance, or right to keep promises.
Philosophical discussion about morality usually tries to find the
reasoning behind these moral assumptions. We have to find a way to
figure out whether or not we have actual moral obligations, and what the
actual obligations are aside from our assumptions. An important point
here is that moral philosophy has to furnish a way of establishing
standards or p rinciples of right and wrong. Any theory of morality which
does not give us a useful method of judging our actions for rightness or
wrongness is useless. Of course, it could be the case that in the course
of philosophical investigation we find that ther e really is no such thing
as rightness or wrongness, and all talk about these concepts is
meaningless. If this is so, we should adopt a philosophy of amorality, or
moral nihilism.
We shall now move on to explore several of the philosophical
treatments of morality, and judge whether or not they provide an adequate
means of judging right and wrong.
THEORIES ABOUT MORALITY:
RELATIVISM
The first major difference in ethical theory is over whether or
not morality is relative or non-relative. The relativist says that right
and wrong are relative to a certain culture or society and therefore
different cultures'; ideas of right and wrong are all correct,
relative to those cultures. Under this theory, morality is dynamic rather
than absolute, and it affords no room for any standard of morality outside
of culture. The question of what makes right acts right is answered by
the relativis t, ";because society says so."; At first
examination this theory seems very plausible and seems to explain the
presence of differences in moral principles among different societies and
subcultures. However, when followed logically, relativism le ads to moral
nihilism. Whose morality is right when two cultures come into conflict,
as with the Nazis and the Allies? Whose morality is right when two groups
within a culture come into conflict, as with slave owners and
abolitionists? Whose morality i s right when two individuals come into
conflict, as with homeowners and burglars? Relativism, since it cannot
provide adequate criteria for what level of culture has the authority to
establish morality, extends to the individual level, and offers no hope
of reconciling moral conflicts. It renders all talk about morality
meaningless, since any statement of right or wrong can be made--; all
moral assertions can be true if related to one thing and false if related
to another thing. The implications of r elativism distill into pure moral
nihilism.
EGOISM
Another set of theories about morality asserts that the only
standard for morality is an obligation to do whatever is most conducive to
our own individual well-being‹ we ought to look only to our own
interests. Under this theory, it is morally righ t to promote our own
well-being and morally wrong to do something that damages that well-being.
This theory is usually not really argued for as much as it is asserted .
As a principle that explains and clarifies our moral assumptions it fails
miserably, since many of our assumptions or feelings of morality are in direct
opposition to it--; for example, most people assume that it is right to
place the needs of others, like our families, above our own. But, it may
be that it doesn't matter how much our feelings conflict with the
theory because our assumptions are worthless and do not need explanation,
and we ought to be selfish even though we don';t think so. Of more
interest is the root of this theory. The standard of egoism‹ that we
a re obligated to promote our own interests‹ is either arbitrary or
it is an a priori duty. If it is arbitrary, then there is really no ought
behind its claims of right and wrong, and we are faced with moral
nihilism‹ it wouldn't really be right or wrong for us to
promote our own self-interest. If the standard is an intuitive duty, then
this theory is really the same at its base as deontology, except that the
specific obligations are disputed.
UTILITARIANISM
Another theory of morality is that of the utilitarians or
teleologists. This theory proposes that acts are right or wrong according
to their effects, and that we should do whatever generates the most
happiness or goodness. This theory is as inept at ex plaining many of our
moral feelings as egoism is, because in its focus on overall goodness it
ignores the special obligations we seem to have to members of our own
family and other groups. Again, however, the root as well as the fruits
of this theory mus t be examined. The principle of utilitarianism is that
we ought to do whatever effects the greatest amount of good. As with the
egoistic standard of self-interest, this must be either an arbitrary
standard or an intuitive one, and it is nihilism in the one case and
deontology in the other.
DEONTOLOGY
Now we come to deontology, which is the theory that acts are right
or wrong because it is our duty to do or not do them. It is different
from utilitarianism in that it places emphasis on the acts themselves
rather than their effects. And while utilitar ians assert that we have
but one duty, to promote the greatest happiness, deontological theorists
say that we have many duties and obligations, and that right and wrong are
determined by the weight of these sometimes conflicting obligations. This
theory seems to go much farther than egoism and utilitarianism in
explaining our feelings of duty and describing the way most of us make
moral decisions. At its root, it relies on our ability to know what is
right or wrong in a non-cognitive way. The deontolog ist would claim that
we know an act is right in the same way that we know a leaf is green, or
that 2 + 2 = 4. W. D. Ross explains this: [The moral
obligation of a certain act] is self-evident just as a mathematical axiom,
or the validity of a form of inference, is evident. The moral order
expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental
nature of the un iverse (and, we may add, of any possible universe in
which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical
structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. In our
confidence that these propositions are true there is involved th e same
trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in mathematics--;
and we should have no justification for trusting it in the latter sphere
and distrusting it in the former. In both cases we are dealing with
propositions that cannot be pro ved, but that just as certainly need no
proof.
The problem of deontology, though, is that not everyone agrees
about the axioms, and it is by no means as easy to sort through as Ross
makes it sound. For example, the ethical egoist thinks that our only duty
is to promote our own well-being. The utili tarian argues that our one
duty is to work for the increase of total happiness in the world. It is
clear that there is confusion over what our duties are, and deontology
seems to be incapable of explaining this confusion. If ethical axioms are
as self-e vident and indisputable as mathematics, how can there be such
widespread disagreement about them? Though, as Richard B. Brandt points
out , many differences in morality are the result of different
workings-out of the same basic principles, there does com e a point at
which two people or cultures are in direct ideological opposition, and it
is seldom clear which side is right. The slave owner and the abolitionist
differ in their sense of basic obligation to not enslave other human
beings. It is not just that they put different values on different
obligations, but that they disagree about the very presence of them.
So then, the major ethical theories can be reduced to either
nihilism or deontology, though they may disagree about the deontological
obligations that we actually or ultimately have. It is clear that moral
axioms are somewhat different than mathematical axioms, since there are
significant disputes over moral principles and not over mathematical ones.
Like mathematics, however, under deontology there is a right answer in
every case, and right and wrong axioms.
DEONTOLOGY IS UNSUPPORTED BY ATHEISM
Naturalism and atheism provide no basis for deontology because
they are incapable of furnishing an explanation of why our intuited duties
are really binding. If our brains are simply chemical processes and we
are nothing more than gobs of reacting matt er, how do our feelings of
duty have any real claim on us? Is there any justification for judgments
about right and wrong at all? All our ideas about what we ought to do
would be arbitrary effects of chemistry and therefore meaningless.
There are many arguments for naturalistic morality , but none of
them establish a particularly good basis for absolute morality. Many of
them are really arguments for relativism, and the others can be reduced to
nihilism or deontology in the same way th at egoism and utilitarianism
can. And, as has been argued above, there is no basis for deontology
under naturalism. It is important to note also that even if naturalism
could furnish a rational support for deontology, it cannot supply a method
of evalua ting conflicting opinions about the nature of our deontological
obligations. So, then, moral nihilism follows necessarily from
naturalism, though it may be disguised in a variety of forms.
MORAL NIHILISM IS UNLIVABLE
Though there are perhaps quite a few people who intellectually
hold a doctrine of moral nihilism, it would be very impressive to see
someone who actually lived consistently under its burden. What faith and
conviction such a person would have to have, to
stifle the irrational feelings of injustice when their car was stolen or
their friend raped or their government oppressed them! Furthermore, as
Donald Crosby points out, the practice of moral nihilism destroys any
possibility of community or trust among
human beings . Whether we have any rational basis for them or not, we
care very deeply about questions of morality and justice. Why is this so?
The theist would say that we were imbued by our Creator with a conscience,
and a powerful sense of right an d wrong. This brings us to the next
subject of this paper.
CHRISTIAN DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY:
A BASIS FOR ETHICS
IN THE REALITY OF GOD
Because I am a Christian and strongly interested in the
philosophical basis and viability of my faith, I turn now to Christian
theism. Let us see if it may afford any basis for a deontological theory
of ethics, and even more, if it may offer any method of resolving
disagreements as to what our specific duties are.
Christian theism asserts that human beings have a knowledge of
right and wrong because our ancestors have eaten of the fruit of the
knowledge of good and evil. This is a very plausible explanation for our
sense of morality and duty‹ if God decided that his creatures should
act a certain way, he would certainly give them guidelines about what was
required of them. Christianity also teaches that mankind is in a fallen
and crippled state, and that even though we may have a knowledge of good
and evil our sinful nature will distort that knowledge in order to follow
its own agenda. This accounts for the disagreements about ethics found
among different cultures and different individuals, in a way that pure
deontology cannot.
Furthermore, Christianity provides an uncorrupted standard to
judge our moral intuitions by-- the revealed command of God.
Hearing that Jesus had silenced the Sadducees, the Pharisees
got together. One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with this
question: "Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the
Law?" Jesus replied: "'Love the Lord your God with all your
heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.' This is the first
and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: 'Love your neighbour
as yourself.' All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two
commandments." (Matthew 22:34-40, NIV).
In these commands morality is grounded in the reality of God. It
is important that the supreme command is to love God, for if it is
followed all the other commandments fall into place. We see the beauty of
the divine command here, as the second command ment falls naturally and
inevitably from the first. It is our duty to love God--; God loves our
neighbors and desires that we do to--; it is our duty to love our
neighbors. Neither of the two commands can ever be in opposition to each
other‹ the second is impossible without basis the first, and the
first is impossible without the practice of the second. We are to be
moral because we have been created to be moral‹ it is God';s
desire and purpose for us. It is interesting to note, to o, that
obedience sets us free by allowing us to live as we were created. As the
German martyr Deitrich Bonhoeffer wrote, ";The commandment of God is
the permission to live as man before God.";
Christianity also admits that all of us fall short of our duties,
and provides a coherent explanation of the reality of sin. If we do know
what is right, on deontological or other grounds, why do we not always do
it? Or, to put it another way, why is o ur ideal of morality, the
standard we expect others to hold to, above the way we actually act? And
why do we have this lingering conviction that the world should be fair
when we see again and againg that it isn';t? Christian theism gives
coherent an swers to these questions that are hard to explain under
naturalism.
THE GOODNESS OF GOD
Much of the criticism of divine command morality stems from
theological confusion regarding the nature of God';s goodness. It is
argued that God cannot be good unless he is good by a universal standard
greater than he is. The answer is that God is not a good (adj.) God, God
is good (noun)--; the essence of all goodness lies in him. There is
nothing outside him, and his decisions about what is good or bad are
arbitrary exercises of his will in accordance with his character. God
dictates what is good because he is the source of all good. He needs no
other standard: ";By myself I have sworn, my mouth has uttered in all
integrity a word that will not be revoked."; (Isaiah 45:23a, NIV).
God is ultimate reality, and there can be no good o utside of his
standard.
WHY BE MORAL?
The final question that arises when studying philosophical
morality is why, assuming that we can figure out what morality requires,
should we do the morally correct thing? In the end we are left with two
possible reasons for being moral: 1) Being moral is the right thing to
do. 2) Being moral promotes our self-interests the best.
Atheism provides no basis for either of these options. Firstly
under naturalism there is nothing in our nature or the nature of the
universe that cares whether we act morally or not. It doesn't matter
at all if we are moral. Secondly, it is ridic ulous to think that it is
always in our self-interest to act morally, when there are so many
situations in which it is extremely convenient to our self-interests to
not be moral, especially when being moral puts us in danger we could avoid
by ignoring the
pinpricks of our consciences.
On the other hand, Christian theism provides foundations for both
reasons to be moral. It is right to be moral, since we were created to be
so and the Source of all goodness desires us to be moral. It is demanded
by our nature that we be moral. Additi onally, there is definite selfish
benefit in being moral, because our eternal fate rests on our actions. As
the Christian alternative band Dig Hay Zoose puts it, ";Motivation of
fear, motivation of love/ One of these is hell, but it gets the job done
..."; In soccer, it is wrong for any player except the goalkeeper to
handle the ball both because it is the fundamental nature of the game that
the ball not be handled, and also because a penalty is imposed on any team
whose member handles the ball.
Similarly, human motivation to be moral is both moral and selfish.
Again, however, we must note that none of us has lived up to the standard,
and God in justice has every right to condemn and destroy us. But by the
atoning sacrifice of Jesus, God has transcended justice and exercised
mercy to those who trust in his salvation.
CONCLUSION
Now all has been heard--; here is the conclusion of the
matter: Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of
man. For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every hidden
thing, whether it is good or evil. (Ecclesiastes 12:13-14,
NIV).
The present theories of morality resolve into either moral
nihilism or deontology, and nihilism is pragmatically unlivable.
Deontology by itself, while doing a good job of describing our feelings of
morality and the way we make decisions, is incapable o f dealing with real
disagreements. Naturalism provides no basis for deontology, and is
incapable of sorting through its difficulties or establishing motivation
for moral action. Divine command provides both a concrete basis for
morality and reasons for being moral. It is the only alternative to moral
nihilism.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Crosby, Donald A. The Specter of the Absurd. New York:
SUNY 1988.
Feinberg, Joel, ed. Reason and
Responsibility. Belmont: Wadsworth 1993.
Martin, Michael.
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Philadelphia:
Temple U. Press 1990.
Owen, H. P. The Moral Argument for
Christian Theism. London: George Allen & Unwin 1965.
Pratt, James B. Naturalism. New Haven: Yale 1939.
Sorley, W. R. Moral Values and the Idea of God. New York:
Macmillan 1921.
by Nathan Vonnahme, fall 1994
nathan at enteuxis dot org